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Abstract
This study demarcates cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and
rent-seeking-inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak
management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending
encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap
non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking
inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 10 joint-stock banks over the period
1997-2006. The paper adjusts for the quality of loans by treating NPLs as a negative
output. The paper shows that Chinese banks have reduced cost inefficiency and
reduced X-inefficiency at a faster rate than rent-seeking inefficiency.
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1.  Introduction
In theory, the Chinese banking market has been open to foreign competition
since the end of 2006. The strategy of allowing a larger stake holding in the Chinese
banking system by foreign banks as a means of improving efficiency has a good
academic pedigree. The link between privatization and efficiency improvement in
former government owned enterprises is now very much an established finding
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). The link between privatization of banking and
efficiency improvement is an emerging research area (see Megginson, 2005 for a
survey).
Given the recent listing of the major state owned banks and the tacit
acceptance of larger stakes by foreign banks in the smaller commercial banks, it is not
surprising that bank efficiency in China has become a popular subject of research in
recent years. A number of studies of Chinese banking efficiency have been published
in Chinese scholarly journals1 but to date there have been only a few studies that are
available to non-Chinese readers2.
While the gradualist economic reform policies of Deng Xiaoping have
transformed management practice and corporate efficiency in the manufacturing
sector, it can be argued that the mindset of the corporatist thinking in management
continues in much of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, including its
banks.
Cost inefficiency relative to 'best practice' is usually blamed on bad
management and poor motivation. Following Leibenstein (1966) this efficiency gap is
termed 'X-inefficiency'. However, in the context of an economy that has only recently
                                                
1 For example Qing and Ou, (2001); Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001); Wei and Wang, (2000); Xue and Yang, (1998) and
Zhao (2000) have used non-parametric methods while Liu and Song (2004), Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Sun (2005) and Qian
(2003) have used parametric methods.
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begun to open its banking sector, this paper argues that a significant cause of bank
inefficiency is rent seeking behavior, rather than X-inefficiency.
 This research has three objectives. First it aims to decompose the measure of
Cost inefficiency in Chinese banks into Technical inefficiency (sometimes viewed as
X-inefficiency), and Rent-seeking inefficiency. This paper argues that while the
underutilization of factors is consistent with the notion of X-inefficiency, the wrong
factor-mix is indicative of 'rent-seeking'. The decomposition of cost inefficiency into
X-inefficiency (technical inefficiency) and rent-seeking inefficiency allows us to
examine their evolution over the sample period.
Second, this paper aims to provide an inferential capability to the point-
estimates of inefficiency through the use of bootstrapping methods. Third, the
bootstrap estimates of inefficiency are use to test various hypotheses regarding the
levels and trends in X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency. The threat of entry
of foreign banks into the Chinese market should lead to improved management, which
should result in improved technical efficiency and lower cost-inefficiency as
incumbent banks attempt to cut costs and consolidate their balance sheets.
This paper is organized on the following lines. The next section outlines the
background to the Chinese banking system. Section 3 discusses the methodology of
the non-parametric method of estimating bank efficiency and the application of
bootstrapping technology. Section 4 reviews the literature and discusses the concept
of X-inefficiency and the implications for its measurement in the context of banking.
Section 5 discusses the data. Section 6 discusses the results and section 7 concludes.
                                                                                                                                           
2 Recent exceptions are studies using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005) and parametric methods by Fu and
Heffernan (2005). Other recent studies in English are, Lin and Zhang (2008), Berger et. al. (2008) and Fu and Heffernen (2008).
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2. Chinese Banking
In 2005, the Chinese banking system consisted of some 30,000 institutions,
including 3 policy banks, 4 state-owned commercial banks, 13l joint-stock
commercial banks, 115 city commercial banks, 238 operational entities of foreign
banks and the rest made up of urban and rural credit cooperatives and other financial
institutions.
Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the
banking sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 1 below
shows that the ratio of total bank assets to GDP has increased from 125%, in 1997, to
205% in 2005. The market is absolutely dominated by the four state owned banks,
although their share of the market has been decreasing steadily through competition
from the other nationwide banks (Joint-stock banks and some City Commercial
Banks).
Table 1: The Chinese banking Market
Variable 1997 2000 2005
Total Assets to
GDP
125.6% 147.1% 205.1%
SOB Employment 1,394.8 thousand 1,4936.3 thousand 1,364.2 thousand
SOB Market share
% assets
88.0% 71.4% 52.5%
NPL ratio SOB 52.7% 31.5% 10.5%
ROAA SOB* 0.93% 0.78% 0.74%
NIM SOB* 1.8% 1.5% 1.7%
Cost-Income Ratio
SOB*
48.2% 59.6% 45.4%
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Annual Accounts, China Regulatory
Banking Corporation website, Almanac of Chinas Finance and Banking, Bankscope
data base, * weighted average by asset share
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Return on average assets (ROAA) and net-interest margins (NIM) of the SOBs are
respectable by Western standards but are well below levels that would be consistent
with economies in the same stage of development (as for example India where NIM
would be in the region of 3%). Part of the problem is that interest rates were heavily
controlled during this period and partly the large amount of non-performing loans on
the books of the commercial banks. The non-performing loans (NPL) ratio of the
SOBs has fallen from 52% in 1997 to 10% in 2005.
Faced with the potential of increased competition from the end of 2006
onwards, the big banks have begun the process of restructuring and reducing unit
costs. Employment in the state-owned banks has declined in recent years and the
major banks have worked to reduce costs as shown in the reduction in the average
cost-income ratio.
 Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under
the government and its agencies3. Under state control, the banks in China served the
socialist plan of directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference
rather than commercial imperative. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial
institutions were allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of
individual Chinese banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution4, the pressure
to reform management, consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and
reduce unit costs has increased with greater foreign exposure.
The theory of market contestability (Baumol, 1982) suggests that incumbent
banks will restructure weak balance sheets, reduce costs, and improve efficiency in
                                                
3 According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under the control of the
government in 1995.
4 There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single investor, except in the case of
joint-venture banks
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preparation for the threat of entry. Chinese banks should exhibit less inefficiency,
whichever way measured, in 2006 than in 1997.
3. Methodology
The basis of the non-parametric method of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) is
the extension by Charnes et al. (1978)  (CCR)5 of the single input-output model of
Farrell (1957) to a multiple input-output generalisation. Technical efficiency (TE) is
measured as the ratio of projected output (on the efficient frontier) to actual input
used. There are a number of papers that describe the methodology of DEA as applied
to banking6, and therefore will not be elaborated here. However, a two-input single-
output illustration will aid the understanding of the decomposition of cost inefficiency
into its Technical (X-inefficiency) and rent-seeking components.
 Figure 1 shows an isoquant qq producing a given output with factor inputs x1
and x2 and isocost ww, which traces the ratio of factor prices. The efficient cost
minimising position is shown at e where ww is tangential to qq. However, employing
a factor combination shown by point c, which is to the right of the isoquant qq
indicates that the firm is technically inefficient. Efficiency is decomposed into
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency (AE).
                                                
5 Charnes et. al (1978) popularised the DEA method. According to Tavares (2002) who produces a bibliography of DEA (1978-
2001), there are 3203 DEA authors whose studies cover a wide range of fields. Banxia.com also compiles DEA papers from 1978
to the present.
6 The most recent being Drake (2004)
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Figure 1: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency
Technical efficiency is measured by the ratio Oa/Oc (Technical inefficiency is
given by ac/Oc). The cost to the firm is shown by w''w'' which is parallel to ww and
passes through point c. Cost efficiency (CE) is measured by Ob/Oc and Ob/Oa gives
AE7.
DEA constructs a non-parametric frontier of the best practices amongst the
decision-making units (DMUs). An efficiency score for each DMU is measured in
relation to this frontier. DEA is relatively insensitive to model specification (input or
output orientation) and functional form8, however the results are sensitive to the
choice of inputs and outputs. The weakness of the DEA approach is that it assumes
data are free from measurement errors. Furthermore, since efficiency is measured in a
                                                
7 It can be seen from this decomposition that under the assumption of constant returns to scale that AE = CE/TE.
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relative way, its analysis is confined to the sample used. This means that an efficient
DMU found in the analysis cannot be compared in a straightforward way with other
DMUs outside of the sample.
One of the criticisms levelled at the DEA approach is that it produces
estimates of efficiency that are not open to statistical inference. In other words if a
DMU has a score of 0.95, in what statistical sense is it 5% inefficient relative to the
benchmark? Without the capability for statistical inference, non-parametric methods
would be weak alternatives to parametric methods of estimating efficiency. However,
uncertainties also exist in the estimation of efficiency using DEA. The most obvious
uncertainty is what comes from measurement error. Measurement error in the context
of data on Chinese banks is particularly marked. There are three potential sources of
error; firstly differences between local bank's accounting procedures and those of
international bodies, secondly differences between local bank's accounting
conventions and thirdly, researcher assumptions relating to the generation of missing
observations. Other uncertainties arise from the estimation of the efficiency frontier;
changes to the inputs and/or outputs can cause large differences in the resulting
scores. Furthermore there may be errors in the sampling variation caused by the
difficulty in obtaining a sufficiently large and consistent sampling frame.
The bootstrap procedure for non-parametric frontier models is set out in Simar
and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b). The efficiency scores calculated with the original
data are used to construct pseudo data. The bootstrap procedure is based on the idea
that there exists a Data Generating Process (DGP), which can be determined by
Monte Carlo simulation. By using the estimated distribution of the DGP to generate a
large number of random samples, a set of pseudo estimates of the efficiency scores iθ
                                                                                                                                           
8 Hababou (2002) and Avkiran (1999) provide a relatively thorough discussion of the merits and limits of the DEA.
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are obtained. However this 'naive' bootstrap yields inconsistent estimates (Simar and
Wilson, 2000a). We follow the homogeneous bootstrap procedure that produces
consistent values of iθ  from a kernel density estimate as given in Simar and Wilson
(2000b). Following the Simar-Wilson method, 1000 bootstrap values of the individual
DMU for all types of efficiency scores are generated in each year9. The appendix
provides a description of the algorithm.
4 Literature Review
Most studies of banking efficiency have focussed on the developed
economies10. While there have been some studies of other Far Eastern economies11,
the number is small in comparison. Indeed, from Berger and Humphrey's (1997)
survey of 130 studies of frontier analysis in 21 countries, only 8 were about
developing and Asian countries (including 2 in Japan). Studies on US financial
institutions were the most common, accounting for 66 out of 116 single country
studies.
A number of efficiency studies of Chinese banks have emerged in recent
years, using both DEA and stochastic frontier analysis12. The consensus of finding
from the DEA studies is threefold. First, because of the continued banking reform
programme technical inefficiency has been declining over time. Second, average bank
efficiency is lower in the state owned banks (SOBs) than in the joint stock banks.
Third, the gap between the two has been narrowing in recent years.
                                                
9 Recent bootstrapping applications to DEA have been conducted by Löthgren and Tambour (1999); in the case of banking
efficiency by Casu and Molyneux (2003); and in the case of Chinese rural credit cooperatives, Dong and Featherstone (2004).
10 See for example Drake and Hall (2003), Cavallo and Rossi (2002), Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002), Maudos et al. (2002),
Drake (2001) Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) and Molyneux and Forbes (1993)
11See Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002), Hardy and di Patti (2001), Karim (2001), Laevan (1999), Katib and Matthews  (1999),
Chu and Lim (1998), Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Fukuyama (1995)
12 In addition to the papers cited in footnote 1, other studies by Chinese scholars that have used non-parametric techniques
include Xu, Junmin and Zhensheng (2001), Zhang and Li (2001), Fang et. al. (2004). Studies using parametric methods include
10
10
Studies of bank efficiency have used the terms technical efficiency and X-
efficiency interchangeably as if they were the same thing. While similar in concept
they are not necessarily the same. The concept of technical efficiency derives its basis
in the neo-classical theory of the firm and assumes profit maximising behaviour. A
firm or a bank may be technically inefficient for technical reasons such as low
training or low human capital levels of managers and workers, or the use of inferior or
out-of-date technology. The diffusion of new technology is not instantaneous and
some firms or banks may lag behind others in the acquisition and utilisation of new
technology. With further training and updating of capital, the firm or bank can expect
to move towards the efficient frontier described by the isoquant in Figure 1. X-
inefficiency is not caused by the variability of skills or the time variability of
technology diffusion but by the use and organisation of such skills and technology.
Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) argue that X-inefficiency constitutes 20%
or more of bank costs. Poor motivation and weak pressure resulting in under
utilization of factors of production, is part of what Leibenstein (1975) describes as
organisational entropy. X-inefficiency arises as a result of low pressure for
performance. Some institutions would be protected by government regulation that
would reduce the external pressure of competition. But even with a higher degree of
pressure from the environment, firms may have organisational deficiencies so that
management signals and incentives are lost in the hierarchy of the organisation.
An alternative interpretation of X-inefficiency is rent seeking in the sense of
Buchanan (1980) and Tullock (1967, 1980). Rent seeking in its basic form is the
appropriation of surplus in the process of production or exchange without any real
contribution to the process of either. Where there are government regulations on
                                                                                                                                           
Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Chen and Song (2004), Liu and Liu (2004), Sun (2005), Qian (2003), Chi, Sun and Lu (2005), Yao,
Feng and Jiang (2004)
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enterprise, barriers to entry and other anti-competitive rules, officials have the
opportunity to extract rents through the mechanism of bribery and corruption.
Therefore the term rent seeking has been generally associated with extortion, bribery
and corruption.
However, a hidden but much more pervasive type of rent seeking is the
extraction of larger budgets for bureaucracies and what results in the non-pecuniary
rewards to workers in government owned enterprises13.  The prestige of the senior
bureaucrats is enhanced if the size of the workforce is expanded to be larger than
necessary to meet production targets. Similarly, offices are more grandiose, holidays
are longer, and benefits are greater and so on.
Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) suggest that the existence of X-inefficiency in
production is the outcome of a rational decision making process that represents on-
the-job compensation to managers. Whereas X-inefficiency is viewed by Leibenstein
(1966, 1978) as non-maximising behaviour, Stigler (1976) argues that its existence is
symptomatic of firms maximising their individual utility functions. Given a
production function, a given set of inputs and factor prices, the bureaucrat minimises
costs subject to a Williamson (1963) type utility function that includes in it arguments
the level of output and a subset of factor inputs14. In other words for the ith bank, given
the K factor inputs, the bureaucrat minimises costs subject to his utility iU  given by
an utility function which contains the M outputs and a subset J of factor inputs,
assuming a standard neo-classical technology.
( )( )ijimiikkm xyUUx ,,, ,min −−′= λω∆
                                                
13 See Tullock (1967) or McKenzie and Tulloch (1975) Chapter 17.
14 In the case of Williamson (1963) the utility function of the manager includes reported profit and
expenditure on staff.
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Assuming 0, >′ jxU (positive marginal utility), the FOC show that an allocative
inefficiency is created that result in higher factor inputs xj above that implied by the
optimal factor mix. In Figure 1, point e defines the optimal factor mix given the
observed factor prices, but point 'a' while allocatively inefficient is the optimal
position for the rent-seeking manager. A bank can organise its input factors to be on
its production frontier but by using the wrong factor mix. Rent seeking in
monopolistic public utilities involves over-staffing, 'elaborate offices and a lot of trips
to important conferences' or 'expensive subsidised restaurants' (McKenzie and
Tullock, 1981). The wrong factor mix in the case of the Chinese banking sector can
be interpreted as excess staffing15. The management of the banks may reduce
technical inefficiency (X-inefficiency as it has been sometimes interpreted) by
moving the cost frontier from w''w'' to w'w', but would still remain cost inefficient as
shown by the gap ab/Oa. The gap between the minimum cost optimal factor mix and
the technically efficient minimum cost associated with the efficient production
                                                
15 In the case of pre-reform China, the bureaucratic bank manager would have been instructed to employ a quota of graduates
from the central bank sponsored universities, and schools as well as retirees from the Peoples Army Officer Corps.
13
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frontier with the sub-optimal factor mix (or allocative inefficiency) can be interpreted
as the inefficiency associated with 'rent seeking'16.
5.0 Data
This study employs annual data (1997-2006) for 14 banks; the four state-owned banks
(SOB), and ten joint-stock commercial banks (JSB). Data for one of the joint-stock
banks was unavailable for 2004 - 2006 (China Everbright); and in those years 13
banks data was used. The total sample consisted of 137 bank year observations. The
main source of the data was Fitch/Bankscope, individual annual reports of banks and
the Almanac of Chinas Finance and Banking (various issues). The choice of banks
was based on the fact that they face a common market and compete nationwide.
Two approaches are normally taken in determining what constitutes bank
input and output. Under the intermediation approach, bank assets measure outputs and
liabilities measure inputs.  In contrast, inputs in the production approach are physical
entities such as labour and capital. Deposits are a measure of output. In this study, we
consider three sets of outputs. First, we use three inputs and three outputs selected
under the intermediation approach for the estimation of technical efficiency. Inputs
are the number of employees (LAB), fixed assets (FA) and total deposits (DEP).
Outputs are total loans (LOANS), other earning assets (OEA), and other operating
income (NII). Although the latter variable remains undeveloped in China, it is selected
to reflect the growing contribution of non-interest income to banks total income.
Second, we consider the quality of the loan portfolio by stripping out non-
performing loans (NPLs) from the stock of loans for each bank (LOANSQ). In both
                                                
16 Crain and Zardkoohi (1980) suggest that X-inefficiency and rent seeking co-exist and that changes to X-inefficiency are offset
by equal changes in rent seeking, so that there is a trade-off between one type of inefficiency against another.
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cases, the vector of inputs is the same as in the first case. The argument for adjusting
loans for NPLs is to mitigate the effect of the large loan portfolios held by the big-4
SOBs on the efficiency calculation. The unadjusted loan portfolio would bias the
efficiency score upwards for the SOBs which have the largest share of loans but also
the highest proportion of NPLs.
The inputs for the construction of cost-efficiency additionally require the
factor prices of the relevant inputs above. We distinguish between the price of labour
(PL), price of fixed capital (PK) and the price of funds (PF). The price of labour is
obtained as the ratio of personnel expenses to employees. The price of fixed capital is
obtained as operating expenses less personnel expenses divided by fixed assets (less
depreciation). The price of funds is obtained from the ratio of interest paid to total
funds.
The availability of uniform and comparable data on Chinese banking is a very
recent development. Researchers have typically made a number of working
assumptions to fill the gaps in data. In general, balance sheet data is available
although the data revisions alter the figures from year to year and up until recently the
accounting standards of Chinese banks differed from international standards (Ng and
Turton 2001). The number of employees are available for the big four state owned
banks but not for all of the joint-stock banks over all years. Similarly, the availability
of personnel expenses varies across banks. In the years that personnel expenses were
not available, the ratio of personnel expenses to total operating expenses in the most
recent year to the missing was applied. In the years where the number of employees
was not available, the ratio of labour to fixed assets in the most recent year available
was applied17. Where there were no personnel expenses available, it was assumed that
                                                
17 Fu and Heffernan (2005) assume that the employee growth matches the growth of total assets and they use the average wage
paid by state-owned and other types of financial institutions to estimate labour cost.
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the bank faced the same capital costs as banks of comparable size, which gave
personnel costs as a residual18.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the input and output data for 1997
and 2006 as a snapshot indicator of the scale of the variables used. The high standard
deviation is an indication of the dominance of the 4 state owned banks. The table
shows how fast earnings assets have grown over this period. The total stock of loans
has grown on average by 173% but subtracting for NPLs the growth has been faster
by 362%. Other earning assets have grown by 405% in part reflecting the activities of
the asset management companies that swapped tranches of the NPLs of the big 4
SOBs for bonds in 1999 and 2001. The most remarkable growth is in non-interest
earnings which have grown by 503% reflecting an increasing source of profit for
banks that have traditional depended on the banking book for the generation of
income.
Table3: Output-Input Variables 1997 - 2006 (million RMB)
Variable Description Mean 1997 SD 1997 Mean 2006 SD 2006
LOANS
RMB mill
Total stock
of loans
430033 657201 1174038 1213224
OEA
RMB mill
Investments 205103 301626 1037659 1203155
NII
RMB mill
Net Fees and
Commissions
862 1922 5200 6141
LOANSQ
RMB mill
Loans less
NPLs
246365 320844 1139258 1124600
LAB Total
Employed
105138 175233 125953 164260
DEP
RMB mill
Total stock
of Deposits
604013 891353 2167172 2258284
FA
RMB mill
Fixed assets 12831 19398 32562 38745
PL Unit price of
labour
.0631 .0380 .1663 .0811
PF Unit price of
funds
.0502 .0202 .0172 .0025
                                                
18 This was only in the case of the Agricultural Bank of China. The Bank of China was used as the benchmark to calculate the
wage share of operational expenses.
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PK Unit price of
fixed assets
.6528 .5282 .6478 .2242
 Sources: Fitch/Bankscope, Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various) and author calculations
from web sources.
 6.0 Empirical Results
Table 4 illustrates the results of the bootstrap method for 1997 and
2006 in the case of Technical Efficiency (X-efficiency) for both the NPL-unadjusted
and NPL-adjusted loan portfolio of the banks. The table shows the median19 of the
bootstrap estimates, the bias-adjusted values and the confidence intervals. Simar and
Wilson (2000a, 2000b) show that the bootstrap estimates are biased but a bias
correction will introduce extra noise that may result in a mean-square error (MSE)
greater than the MSE of the bias-unadjusted bootstrap values. In the limit the bias
corrected MSE will be four times that of the uncorrected estimate and  Simar and
Wilson caution against the bias correction unless the ratio ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
2
2
3
1
σ
B
 is greater than
unity. Where B is the bias correction and 2σ  is the sample variance of the
uncorrected bootstrap values. This condition was satisfied 78-84% of the time for
each year in the sample. Although we report the bias-corrected estimates, the non
universal satisfaction of the bias correction condition means that the median estimates
must be treated with caution.
17
17
Table 4: Bootstrap Estimates of Technical efficiency (Bias corrected,
median estimates); 1997 & 2006 CRS
Bank Output 1997 2006
TE Bias
Adjusted
Confidence
intervals 95%
TE Bias
Adjusted
Confidence
intervals 95%
ABOC Unadjusted .9286 .8487* .8971 .9976 1.0091 .9152* .9572 1.678
Adjusted .4836 .3054* .4183 .6124 .9482 .7475* .8952 1.186
BOC Unadjusted 1.519 .6555 .3619 9.2055 1.3029 .7602* 1.0192 2.7772
Adjusted 1.4811 .6647 .2369 5.7010 1.3114 .7573* 1.0283 2.3151
CCB Unadjusted 1.6778 .5959* 1.2848 2.3951 .9999 .9194* .9695 1.0723
Adjusted 1.5431 .5635* 1.083 2.4132 1.0112 .8938* .9742 1.1175
ICBC Unadjusted 1.0241 .9202* .9663 1.9762 1.1463 .6562* .9494 2.1750
Adjusted .5462 .2762* .4348 .8265 1.1633 .6411* .9555 2.331
BComm Unadjusted 1.7939 .5570* 1.4080 2.4404 1.4504 .6600* 1.1548 2.0092
Adjusted 1.6506 .6050* 1.2892 2.2381 1.3978 .6278* 1.1331 1.8989
CITIC Unadjusted 1.5565 .6379* 1.1937 2.0459 1.4158 .6766* 1.1723 1.914
Adjusted 1.3964 .7182* 1.1345 1.8470 1.4083 .6295* 1.1670 1.8631
CMB Unadjusted 1.5789 .6279* 1.2867 2.1975 1.3855 .6990* 1.1908 1.6847
Adjusted 1.5613 .6431* 1.2238 2.2317 1.3806 .6814* 1.1856 1.6763
CMBCL Unadjusted 1.9288 .5150* 1.5810 2.6368 1.1009 .8136* .9937 1.3612
Adjusted 1.7305 .5863* 1.1903 2.5958 1.0988 .7630* .9839 1.3716
EVERBRT Unadjusted 1.0345 .7732* .9402 1.2845 - - - -
Adjusted .8768 .4507* .6921 1.2044 - - - -
GDB Unadjusted 1.6470 .6030* 1.2551 2.1861 1.3251 .6625* 1.0678 1.7580
Adjusted 1.4875 .6751* 1.1845 1.9952 1.2821 .6262* 1.0639 1.6831
HUAXIA Unadjusted 3.3857 .2944* 2.0423 5.3428 1.6716 .5809* 1.2880 2.0847
Adjusted 3.4962 .2855* 2.2137 5.3695 1.6464 .5576* 1.3208 2.0790
IBCL Unadjusted 1.2858 .7795* .7931 4.867 1.1351 .5808* .8422 3.1528
Adjusted .5601 .2714* .4360 .8632 1.1194 .8552* .8764 2.4531
SDB Unadjusted 1.0533 .9107* 1.0038 1.2363 1.2583 .7768* 1.1027 1.6326
Adjusted .9119 .3332* .6608 1.3266 1.1938 .7464* 1.0349 1.5603
SPB Unadjusted 2.0651 .9107* 1.5949 2.8071 1.5465 .6232* 1.2231 2.1256
Adjusted 15.918 .0595* 3.815 47.25 1.4914 .5769* 1.1965 2.0215
* significantly different from unity at the 95% level of confidence
                                                                                                                                           
19 The median estimate provides a more robust measure of the score when the distributions are skewed
as in DEA.
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Table 5 presents the results of bias corrected bootstrap estimation of X-
inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the Constant Returns to Scale (CRS)
assumption.  For reasons of brevity we show four years for both types of output.
The adjustment of loans for NPLs has had a significant effect in worsening the
X-inefficiency score of a number of banks but in particular the State Owned Banks
(excluding Bank of China). This should not be a surprise as the SOBs (the first 4 in
Table5) have a larger concentration of NPLs than the JSBs over the sample. However
by 2006 the NPL ratio for all the banks declined significantly so that the difference
between the two measures produces minimal difference between the two measures of
X-inefficiency.
Table 5: Bootstrap Estimates of Inefficiency (Bias corrected, median
estimates); 1997-2006 (%) CRS
Bank Output 1997 2000 2003 2006
X-
ineff
Rent X-
ineff
Rent X-
ineff
Rent X-
ineff
Rent
ABOC Unadjusted 14.5 50.5 27.6 36.6 4.7 54.3 8.5 47.5
Adjusted 69.5 27.8 54.8 21.1 28.5 38.9 25.3 37.2
BOC Unadjusted 34.5 25.6 33.9 0.0 43.9 0.0 24.0 8.6
Adjusted 33.5 55.1 31.9 0 44.1 0 24.3 10.4
CCB Unadjusted 7.9 52.9 42.7 25.3 16.0 37.0 34.7 13.2
Adjusted 72.4 23.8 42.0 24.8 15.5 35.3 35.9 13.7
ICBC Unadjusted 22.1 30.2 36.2 25.1 19.4 23.9 12.6 26.8
Adjusted 72.9 23.7 48.7 17.8 11.4 36.2 14.4 27.0
BComm Unadjusted 40.1 15.7 46.3 0 17.1 38.7 8.5 42.4
Adjusted 43.7 50.0 45.9 0 19.2 37.2 10.6 40.7
CITIC Unadjusted 44.3 6.7 39.3 23.8 36.6 10.6 34.0 8.3
Adjusted 39.5 49.3 38.0 22.8 38.1 11.2 37.2 6.2
CMB Unadjusted 36.2 17.6 25.4 34.6 52.1 0 32.3 3.1
Adjusted 28.1 64.1 24.0 26.5 52.1 0 37.1 0
CMBCL Unadjusted 37.2 17.1 22.1 26.5 25.2 13.1 30.0 0
Adjusted 35.7 51.0 18.2 28.7 25.7 11.2 31.9 0
EVERBRT Unadjusted 48.5 2.9 41.5 16.0 35.1 6.1 - -
Adjusted 41.4 51.5 38.8 17.9 32.5 21.5 - -
GDB Unadjusted 22.7 37.9 29.5 34.6 15.3 33.6 18.6 22.0
Adjusted 54.9 38.5 35.9 28.3 16.1 48.0 23.7 19.4
HUAXIA Unadjusted 39.7 15.4 23.6 36.0 31.0 20.0 33.7 11.8
Adjusted 32.5 59.1 30.4 19.7 28.1 22.3 37.4 10.0
IBCL Unadjusted 70.6 0 26.6 34.4 32.4 18.1 41.9 0
Adjusted 71.4 0 22.9 33.2 28.9 21.3 44.2 0
SDB Unadjusted 8.9 56.3 23.1 41.3 18.1 29.2 22.3 18.1
Adjusted 66.7 26.3 31.7 32.8 21.4 28.4 25.4 18.5
SPB Unadjusted 51.3 0 33.9 31.6 40.9 0.9 37.8 0
Adjusted 94.4 0 33.3 30.5 44.7 0 42.0 17.0
19
19
Three questions can be asked about the bootstrap estimates as a whole and
three hypotheses can be tested. First, is there a significant difference between the level
of X- and rent-seeking inefficiency between the SOBs and JSBs and what differences
do the NPL adjustment to loans make? The theory of rational inefficiency would
suggest that there is a trade-off between X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency
and if there is a strong preference for rent-seeking, X-inefficiency should be lower
relative to Rent-seeking inefficiency. Second is there evidence that inefficiency is
being reduced over time? The impending opening up the banking market under WTO
rules would suggest that all banks would be upping their game by improving relative
cost efficiency, which implies that relative X-inefficiency and rent-seeking
inefficiency should decline over the period. Third, if there is evidence of inefficiency
reduction, is there a difference between the speed of reduction of X-inefficiency and
Rent-Seeking inefficiency?20  We explore these questions in turn.
Table 6 below examines the difference in group means of inefficiency using a
non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) test. The first two rows of Table 6 show that mean
estimate of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency dont come from the same
population and that contrary to the prediction of the rational inefficiency hypothesis,
rent-seeking inefficiency is not greater than X-inefficiency on either measure of
output. The first two rows of Table 6 show the means of X-inefficiency and rent-
seeking inefficiency for all the banks with the two different measures of output.
Table 6: Mean inefficiency, Unadjusted loans and NPL adjusted loans
Measure X-inefficiency Rent-seeking
Inefficiency
z value
                                                
20 The SOBs have in the past been used by the state to employ graduates from the central bank
sponsored universities and to place retiring officers from the Peoples Liberation Army. Consequently,
rent-seeking inefficiency should decline at a slower rate than X-inefficiency
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Unadjusted 34.0% 18.5% 4.59***
NPL - Adjusted 28.1% 18.8% 7.35***
Unadjusted SOB 28.9% 19.4% 1.33
Unadjusted JSB 36.1% 18.2% 0.74
Adjusted SOB 16.1% 23.8% 4.74***
Adjusted JSB 32.9% 16.8% 2.19**
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%
There is a clear statistical difference between the mean level of X-inefficiency
and rent-seeking inefficiency over the full sample period. Average rent-seeking
inefficiency is lower than X-inefficiency for all banks. Stronger differences emerge
when the sample is split between SOBs and JSBs. The next four rows show the mean
inefficiency breakdown separated by SOB and JSB for the two different measures of
output. There is no statistical difference in the mean levels of X-inefficiency and rent-
seeking inefficiency of the SOBs and the JSBs when loans are unadjusted. However,
stripping out NPLs from Loans produces clear differences. Rent-seeking inefficiency
is significantly higher in the SOBs than JSBs. So evidence of rational inefficiency is
more prevalent in the SOBs once the loan portfolio is adjusted for quality.
The second and third questions are addressed by modelling the dynamics of
both type of inefficiency.  Pooling the data, we use SURE estimation to model the rate
of convergence of X-inefficiency (XI) and rent-seeking inefficiency (RI). The
dependant variable is respectively the change in X-inefficiency (∆XI) and rent-
seeking inefficiency (∆RI). The speed of convergence is captured by the negative
coefficient on the lagged values of XI and RI respectively. The larger the absolute
value of the negative coefficient, the faster the rate of convergence.
We use lagged values of bank-specific variables as controls. A one-year lag is
specified as a means of eliminating potential endogeneity in the determining
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variables. The lagged bank cost-income ratio (COST_1) is operational cost to total
revenue) is an indicator of management competence; the higher the cost-income ratio
the higher the level of inefficiency. The lag of the natural logarithm of total assets is
used as a proxy for the size of the bank (SIZE_1). The lag of fee income (FEE_1) as a
percent of total revenue is an indicator of management flexibility in diversifying the
output of the bank and higher values would be expected to be associated with lower
levels of inefficiency. The variable FOR indicates the share of foreign ownership of
the bank and may be associated with lower levels of inefficiency. Interaction terms for
different speeds of adjustment between the big 4 SOBs and the joint-stock banks are
captured by XI_BIG4_1 and RI_BIG4_1. The Non-performing loans ratio (NPL)
indicates past management failures and would be associated with higher levels of
inefficiency. Table 7 presents some selected results.
Table 7: All banks, 1997-2006, SURE estimation, SE values in parenthesis
Unadjusted Adjusted
Dep Variable ∆XI ∆RI ∆XI ∆RI
Intercept .6624***
(.146)
.2484**
(.124)
.6075***
(.141)
-.0077
(.0400614)
Ln(SIZE_1) -.0293***
   (.010)
-.0260***
(.010)
-.0261***
(.009)
-
FEE_1 -.0215***
(.007)
0.0114*
(.006)
-.0195***
(.005)
-
COST_1 - 0.0025***
(.001)
- 0.0012*
(.001)
FOR - 0.0041***
(.002)
- -
NPL - .0012***
(.001)
- -
RI_1 -.1363**
(.066)
-.7403***
(.071)
-.2908***
(.071)
-.3111***
(.060)
XI_1 -.7335***
(.074)
-.6373***
(.088)
-
B4*XI_1 .2044***
(.007)
- - -
B4*RI_1 - 0.4051***
(.109)
- -
R2 0.4118 0.5031 0.3496 0.1888
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The first thing to note about the results of Table 7 is that the coefficient on the lagged
measures of inefficiency are negative and statistically significant indicating a
significant decline in both types of inefficiency over time. The negative effect of the
lag in rent-seeking inefficiency on the level of X-inefficiency highlights the trade-off
between the two types of inefficiency. The lagged operational cost-income ratio
explains rent-seeking inefficiency rather than X-inefficiency indicating the focus of
costs towards factor hoarding.
Looking at the NPL unadjusted results first it can be seen that an interaction
term for the SOBs show that the speed of decline in both types of inefficiency was
faster in the case of the JSBs than the SOBs. However, the rate of decline in X-
inefficiency was faster than the rate of decline of rent-seeking in the SOBs. In this
respect, the results of this paper differ strongly from the findings of Chen et al (2005)
who find no trend improvement in bank efficiency21.
Once loans are adjusted for NPLs the speed of decline slows and there is no
statistical difference in the speed of decline of inefficiency between the two types of
banks.  However, the speed of decline of rent inefficiency is slower than the decline in
X-inefficiency. This is explained by the extraordinary increase in the balance sheets
of the Chinese banks that has resulted in the reduction in X-inefficiency for the non-
benchmark banks. However, the social problems associated with dealing with
inherited over-staffing and over-branching is likely to produce a slower speed of
adjustment of rent-seeking inefficiency particularly in the case of the state-owned
banks.
                                                
21 Chen et. al (2005) uses a wider data frame of banks, including regional joint-stock banks and international trust and
investment companies. It can be argued that the use of DMUs that do not compete in the same geographical market or product is
a violation of the homogeneity requirement of DEA.
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7.0  Conclusion
This paper has used non-parametric methods to conduct an analysis of
inefficiency in a sample of Chinese banks. The estimates of bank inefficiency were
buttressed with bootstrapping techniques to enable statistical inference. In general, the
estimates from bootstrapping support the view that relative efficiency has improved.
We have partitioned cost inefficiency into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking
inefficiency in the spirit of the rational inefficiency model. Inefficiency in Chinese
banking is made up of both X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency. Adjusting
for the quality of the loan portfolio, this paper shows that bureaucratic rent-seeking is
more prevalent in the state-owned banking sector than in the JSBs.
Bureaucratic rent seeking is a rational response to a particular set of incentives
based on protectionist policy. It would be no surprise to learn that over the years of
protected growth, as the banks were vessels for the channelling of unprofitable loans
to state-owned enterprises, the banking sector was forced to develop rent seeking
strategies and act as employment sponges for the educated youth in China. While the
dismantling of protection and the listing of the state-owned banks and the plans to list
joint stock banks will alter the incentive structure for managers, the trend reduction in
rent-seeking inefficiency will be balanced by social and political constraints 
particularly those faced by the SOBs.
We find that once Loans are adjusted for NPLs, the speed of decline of rent-
seeking inefficiency is slower than that of X-inefficiency. This suggests that banks
have inherited rent-seeking strategies that are more difficult to reduce than X-
inefficiency. The finding that X-inefficiency is being reduced faster than rent-seeking
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inefficiency is an indicator that Chinese bank managers are doing the best they can in
improving efficiency given the constraints.
However, we must still interpret the results with caution. The improvement in
efficiency is in terms of the benchmark banks, which are themselves 'best-practice'
Chinese banks. The real benchmarks should be foreign banks competing on an equal
footing or foreign banks operating in their home countries under similar conditions of
development and risk.  However, the argument of this paper is that there have been
significant improvements in bank efficiency. The main message of this paper is that
while Chinese banks may not be in the best shape they could be to meet the
challenges of post 2007, they are in better shape than they have ever been.
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Appendix
The bootstrap algorithm is summarised in the following steps. The algorithm is run on
MATLAB and the codes are available from the authors on request.
Step 1. Compute the original DEA efficiency scores using the linear programming
model (equation 1) and let ii θδ /1 = ;
Step 2. Since radial distances are used, we will refer to the polar coordinate of the
input vector of each DMU x defined by its modulus xxx ′== )(ωω  and its angle
1
2
,0)(
−
⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
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∈=
K
x πηη  where for j=1,, K-1, )/arctan( 11 xx ji +=η  if 01 >x  and
2
πη =i  if 01 =x . Then translate the data into polar coordinates: ),,( iiiy δη , i = 1, . . .
, K. And form the augmented matrix L~  by: [ ]iiiyL δη = , [ ]iiiR yL δη 2 −= ,
⎥
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⎢
⎣
⎡
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Step 3. Compute the estimated covariance matrices 1Σ , 2Σ  of L and LR by
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where 11S  is )1()1( −+×−+ NMNM , 2112 SS ′=  is 1)1( ×−+ NM and 22S  is scalar,
and compute the lower triangular matrices 1L  and 2L  such that 111 LL ′=Σ  and
222
 LL ′=Σ  via the Cholesky decomposition.
Step 4. Choose an appropriate bandwidth h as described in Simar and Wilson (2000b)
using the information in L~ , 1Σ , 2Σ .
Step 5. Draw K rows randomly, with replacement from the augmented matrix L~  and
denote the result by the )( NMK +×  matrix *~L ; compute *z , the 1×K  row vector
containing the means of each column of *~L .
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Step 6. Use a random number generator to generate a )( NMK +×  matrix ε of i.i.d.
standard normal pseudo-random variates; let .iε  denote the ith row of this matrix.
Then compute the )( NMK +×  matrix *ε  with the ith row *.iε  given by jii L′= .
*
. εε  so
that ),0(~*. jNMi N Σ+ε  where j=1 if the ith row of 
*~L  was drawn from rows 1, . . . , K
of L~ , or j=2 if the ith row of *~L  was drawn from rows (K + 1), . . . , 2K of L~ .
Step 7. Compute the )( NMK +×  matrix ***2/12 )~()1( zihLMh K ⊗+++=Γ
− ε
where KKK iiKIM ′−= )/1(  is the usual KK ×  centring matrix with KI  denoting an
identity matrix of order K, Ki  an 1×K  vector of ones, and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker
product.
Step 8. Partition Γ  so that [ ]321 iii γγγ=Γ , where Mi R+∈1γ ， [ ] 12 2/,0 −∈ Ki πγ  and
),(3 +∞−∞∈iγ  for i = 1, . . . , K. Define the )( NMK +×  matrix of bootstrap pseudo-
data *L  such that the i the row *iz  of 
*L  is given by
⎩
⎨
⎧
−
≥
=
otherwise
z
iii
iiii
i )2(
1)(
321
3321*
γγγ
γγγγ
Step 9. Translate the polar coordinates in *L  to Cartesian coordinates. This yields the
bootstrap sample { }Kiii yx 1** ),( = .
Step 10. For the given point (x, y), compute ),(* yxθ  by solving the DEA program
taking { }Kiii yx 1** ),( =  as the benchmarks and compute the bias-corrected efficiency
scores *2 /),(~ θθθ =yx
Step 11. Repeat Steps 5~11, obtain another group of bias-corrected efficiency scores,
reducing the input vector of each DMU x into xθ~ . Compute the cost efficiency scores
using equation(2) from the reduced inputs and outputs.
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 Step 12. Similar to Step 11, obtain rent-seeking-efficiency scores (the difference
between cost-efficiency score and technical (x)-efficiency score)
Step 13. Repeat Steps 5~12 B (=1000) times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates
{ }Bbb yx 1),(~ =θ  and cost efficiency scores and x-efficiency scores.
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